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THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND by James Boyle. Yale University Press, 2008, 315 pp. Paperback
$28.50.
Reviewed by Julie Cromer Young, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
jyoung@tjsl.edu.
In the age of the Internet, what are lawmakers doing to protect the public
from copyright? This is the central question James Boyle considers as he
explores the history, application, and future of intellectual property laws to
works of authorship using contemporary technologies. On one hand, Boyle
draws lessons from history, adroitly explaining the positions of legal
theorists such as Thomas Babington Macaulay and Thomas Jefferson
toward the possibilities and limitations of intellectual property. On the
other hand, Boyle draws distinctions from pre-Internet thought, noting the
transformations on traditional intellectual property that the age of
instantaneous publication and distribution requires. The theme unifying the
two is clear: In our history of expanding intellectual property rights,
legislatures have consistently neglected to preserve the public domain as an
important natural resource.
After briefly explaining the relevant intellectual property law for those not
already versed in the field, Boyle focuses the reader on a letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, dated 1813 (p.17). In that letter,
Jefferson opines about the theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property,
“[c]onsidering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right,
but for the benefit of society” 1 (p.21). Boyle identifies a set of cautions in
Jefferson’s letter, labeling the “Jefferson Warning,” akin to Miranda
Warnings given suspected criminals (p.21). Those cautions include the
difference between intellectual property and tangible property, the lack of
entitlement to intellectual property rights, and inherent and proscribed
limitations on intellectual property rights (p.21-22). Writings and orations
of others, such as British Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, mirrored this
philosophy about intellectual property, questioning the assertion that
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copyright is a natural right and upholding “a tradition of skeptical
minimalism” that treated intellectual property rights warily (p.35).
If the Jefferson Warning is Boyle’s protagonist, its antagonist is the Internet
Threat—the notion that “[w]ithout an increase in private property rights, ...
cheaper copying will eat the heart out of our creative and cultural
industries” (p.53). This Internet Threat, Boyle argues, is responsible for a
pervasive belief that “[t]he strength of intellectual property rights must vary
inversely with the cost of copying” (p.60). In turn, this belief has led to a
system that ignores the benefits of the Internet and instead seeks merely to
contain it, and in particular, the intellectual property its users may copy.
The intended result is achieved by a conversion of previously common
property into private ownership—a second “enclosure movement”
reminiscent of the enclosure of English commons from the fifteenth to the
nineteenth centuries (p.43).
Conversion is occurring in the form of piecemeal legislation intended to
address specific needs of specific industries, effectively curtailing public
access to information that would previously have been considered incapable
of ownership. As an example, Boyle considers the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). 2 The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of
copyright protection systems, such as encryption and digital rights
management. Application of the DMCA, by granting rights irrespective of
traditional copyright analysis including fair use, operates contrary to the
First Amendment, becoming “a congressionally created off-switch for fair
use” created specifically as a reaction to the Internet Threat (p.97).
Moreover, interpretation of the DMCA through the courts has stifled the
competition that intellectual property rights are intended to foster.
Specific examples further illustrate the importance and recent enclosure of
the public domain to creative and innovative industries, as well as those
industries’ disparate reactions. In an interesting narrative, Boyle integrates
pop culture and copyright law to demonstrate how the music industry, once
reliant on the public domain for inspiration, now thwarts others in that same
creative process with increased rules and heightened protection. Asks
Boyle, “[a]re we in fact killing musical creativity with the rules that are
supposed to defend it?” (p.156).
On the other hand, Boyle examines the cases of synthetic biology and
computer code, reflecting that the successful steps taken to grant intellectual
property rights in industry outputs have resulted in a countermovement to
ensure the public availability of information. In the field of synthetic
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biology, in which “the product or process involves biological materials not
found in nature” (p.171), many scientists rebuff patent rights in the name of
innovation. Notes Boyle, “I was depressed by the idea that scientists would
have to spend their valuable time trying to work out how to save their
discipline from being messed up by the law” (p.174). In the case of
computer software, the creators took charge, offering the software as free
and open source. Using the General Public License from the Creative
Commons, Boyle notes that the:
…open quality of the creative enterprise spreads. It is not simply a
donation of a program or a work to the public domain, but a
continual accretion in which all gain the benefits of the program on
pain of agreeing to give their additions and innovations back to the
communal project (p.186).
One of Boyle’s stronger arguments is to recognize that these examples and
arguments are just that, and the ultimate proof may be a “test case in which
one country adopts the proposed new intellectual property right and another
similarly situated country does not, and we can assess how they are both
doing after a number of years” (p.207). To this end, he studies the
European Union Database Directive, 3 the sui generis right in effect in the
European Union since 1996, and the resulting report by the Commission
tasked with evaluating it ten years later. His conclusions, and the
conclusions of the European Union Commission, are telling: even when
given specific intellectual property rights to stimulate intellectual creation in
a given industry, that protection actually hinders production of new
databases, as opposed to facilitating it. The analogy is imperfect. It might
be difficult to posit that the United States is a country “similarly situated” to
any European country in the production of databases, and this example
addresses creation of a new ilk of intellectual property as opposed to the
extension of established intellectual property rights to new technologies.
Despite these weaknesses, Boyle’s story of the Database Directive responds
nicely to the question of whether governmental privatization of information
has any social benefit at all.
Ultimately, Boyle calls us out on our cultural agoraphobia—our likelihood
“to undervalue the importance, viability, and productive power of open
systems, open networks, and nonproprietary production” (p.231). He
identifies the major problems intellectual property faces—the relative
obscurity of the issue, the implications for distinct and separate groups, the
ideology shaping its adherents’ beliefs, and the lack of empirical
evidence— and posits that this moment in time for intellectual property law
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and policy is at the same point that the environmental law movement
occupied in the 1950s (p.239). He calls for a “cultural environmental
movement” (p.247), allowing us to see and preserve the public domain as a
national resource just as important as clean air and water. And, while
tempering his criticism with optimism, Boyle leaves us with a warning of
his own:
Good intellectual property policy will not save our culture. But bad
policy may lock up our cultural heritage unnecessarily, leave it to
molder in libraries, forbid citizens to digitize it, even though the vast
majority of it will never be available publicly and no copyright
owner can be found (p.246).
ENDNOTES
1

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), in
13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 335 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Society of the United States,
1907), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/mtjserI.html.
2

Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35
U.S.C.).
3

Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 77,
27.3.1996, p. 20–28, located at http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEX
numdoc&numdoc=31996L0009&model=guichett&lg=en.
© 2011 Julie Cromer Young
Suggested Citation: 1 The IP Law Book Review 50 (2011).
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GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS:
PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS
AND LIABILITY REGIMES, edited by Geertrui Van Overwalle.
Cambridge University Press, 2009, 455 pp. Hardcover $123.00.
Reviewed by J. Jonas Anderson, Microsoft Research Fellow,
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology.
janderson@law.berkeley.edu.
The typically esoteric world of patents has recently been thrust into the
headlines as cases involving patented genes have received an unprecedented
amount of press. For decades, academics, scientists, practicing attorneys,
and legislators have vigorously debated the merits of granting patents on
genes and medical diagnostic procedures. Only recently, however, have the
courts entered the fray. For example, in March 2010, Judge Sweet of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York handed down a
ruling that invalidated a number of patents covering the BRCA genes that
signal an increased likelihood of developing breast cancer. 1 Judge Sweet’s
ruling held that the patent claims on the BRCA genes were directed to
unpatentable “product of nature.” A few months later in a separate case, the
U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, following a grant-vacateremand from the Supreme Court, upheld the validity of a patented method
for determining a proper drug dosage level based on a patient’s metabolite
levels. 2 The courts’ entrance into the debate surrounding patenting of
human genetic material and medical diagnostics has elicited interest from
the full spectrum of public news outlets: from the New York Times to
Nature magazine. 3 It would seem that one, or perhaps both, of these cases
will be heard at the Supreme Court. In any case, the contentiousness
surrounding gene patenting and diagnostic patenting is unlikely to subside
any time soon.
In light of the controversy surrounding patents on genetic material, Geertrui
Van Overwalle has compiled a collection of writings on this topic by an
outstanding group of academics and practicing attorneys in a book titled
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GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS.
Van Overwalle and her fellow contributors ask whether collaborative
licensing models can reduce public concerns that gene patents will lead to
reduced access to research and health care choices. Van Overwalle’s book
examines the best methods of achieving innovation and maximizing access
while assuming that “the problems created by patent law in genetic
diagnostics are best served by contractual, collaborative measures” (p.454),
and not by restricting patentability as some commentators have proposed.
In light of the book’s purpose and scope, this review will touch on the
licensing ideas raised by the authors while critically examining Van
Overwalle’s summary of the various authors’ contributions, which appears
at the book’s conclusion.
Before providing private solutions to the problems surrounding gene
patenting, Van Overwalle first seeks to identify the precise problems that
widespread patenting of genetic material and diagnostic procedures create.
Two primary concerns are identified, both of which focus on transaction
costs. First, the book examines the problem of increased transaction costs
in upstream or basic research. Incentives to engage in initial upstream
research can be reduced when an excessive number of property rights
holders drive up the transaction costs associated with commercializing those
property rights. 4 In the patent field, upstream research is thought to be
harmed when, in order to commercialize a particular technology, it is
necessary to obtain rights in a multitude of patents held by a multitude of
owners (patent thickets), or when multiple patents covering the same
technology are held by competing patent owners (blocking patents).
Various contributors to GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE
LICENSING MODELS note that empirical studies suggest that patent
thickets are not currently a concern in the genetics field (pp.4, 387).
Regardless, many observers predict that patent thickets may emerge in the
field of medical diagnostics as diagnostic tools improve and personalized
DNA arrays become more affordable. Indeed, patent clearance may prove
to be the primary driver of diagnostic cost in the coming age of personalized
medicine. Second, the book examines the risk of reduced downstream
investment, or under-commercialization of patented genetic inventions. At
least part of the “translational gap” between early-stage genetic research and
therapeutic applications of that research may stem from the transaction
costs associated with drug-related negotiations between academic and
industry players.
In order to overcome obstacles to the upstream research problem, Van
Overwalle’s book examines three primary collaborative arrangements:
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patent pools, clearinghouses, and open source models. Patent pools, such as
the DVD and MPEG-2 pools, have been successfully employed for some
time by the electronics industry (pp.33-41). However, the translation of a
licensing arrangement from the electronics industry to the diagnostic
industry is not without pitfalls. First, most successful patent pools to date
(particularly in the electronics industry) have been established in order to
create industry standards; the genetics industry, by contrast, does not have
such standards with which to comply (pp.38, 48). Whereas the electronics
industry is able to increase the value of its products via mutually agreedupon standards, the genetics industry does not enjoy such interoperability
benefits. The lack of standards-driven economics in the genetic industry
leads Birgit Verbeure to conclude that patent pools will not provide great
benefits to the genetics industry (p.29). Second, and perhaps most troubling
from a diagnostic perspective is the problem of holdouts. In the electronics
industry, interdependency increases value; the establishment of standards
(e.g., the standard diameter of compact discs) increases interoperability and
reduces or eliminates switch-over costs. In essence, consumer electronics
manufacturers rely on their competitors to create a market for electronic
products. Value in the biotech industry, on the other hand, is driven by
exclusivity, not interoperability (pp.55-56). Thus, biotech patentees risk
much less and stand to gain much more than electronics patentees by
refraining from joining a patent pool. Some authors, such as Jorge
Goldstein, envision a standards-based regime emerging in the biotech
industry via respected health organizations such as the WHO or NIH (p.56).
Others, including Dan Burk and Verbeure, suggest that reducing the
property-like rights of the patent holder (either through liability regimes or
compulsory licenses) may ameliorate some of the holdout issues (pp.28,
306). While promising, both governmentally-set standards and compulsory
licenses involve non-contractual solutions to the holdout problem, which, as
I discuss below, is not optimal.
The second licensing arrangement discussed in Van Overwalle’s book is the
clearinghouse model. Clearinghouses come in many shapes and sizes, some
dealing primarily with efficient knowledge transfer while others are
concerned with rights management and royalty collection. While the idea
of facilitating access and knowledge through clearinghouses enjoys
universal authorial support, the various authors acknowledge that the
analogy between existing copyright clearinghouses and potential patent
clearinghouses is inexact at best and undesirable at worst. For example,
Esther Van Zimmeren concludes that the time is not ripe for patent royalty
collection clearinghouses (pp.111-12). She reads the literature on copyright
clearinghouses as demonstrating that while “collectivization” of rights and
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enforcement may indeed increase the value of IP rights, it is unclear
whether access is increased by such clearinghouses (pp.111-12). Michael
Spence cautions that any analogy between established copyright
clearinghouses and potential patent clearinghouses is inexact (pp.166-67).
Spence concludes that patent royalty clearinghouses could lower transaction
costs for genetic innovators, but may also increase royalty stacking and cost
of access for consumers (p.167). For Spence, establishment of patent
clearinghouses will not overcome the potential anticommons problems in
the genetics industry and may exacerbate rather than remedy the access
problem in diagnostics (pp.166-68).
The book suggests that open source models are a third licensing scheme that
could be employed to improve access to diagnostics while maintaining
incentives to innovate in the industry. Janet Hope proposes employing the
open-source model that has transformed the software industry (p.192).
However, other authors cast doubt on the applicability of software norms
into the genetics industry conclusion. Arti Rai notes that the set of
participants and economic realities in biotechnology is wholly different than
that of software (p.217). Whereas the software industry involves numerous
manufacturers and millions of users, the biotech industry has a smaller set
of players and a targeted group of potential consumers. More importantly,
there is little evidence that IP rights are strong drivers of creation in the
software industry, whereas IP serves as the principal incentive to biotech
companies (p.215). Thus, software designers are likely to be much more
willing than their biotech counterparts to contribute to a public commons.
Echoing Rai’s suggestion that the high value of IP in the biotech industry
may severely reduce the applicability of an open source model, Andrzej
Kilian states that the only opportunity for using open-source in genetics will
be “in an area of limited financial opportunity, where competition with
mainstream companies would be less intense” (p.211). Wholly new
business models would have to arise in order for biotech to embrace opensource, Van Overwalle concludes (p.431).
Van Overwalle concludes that licensing schemes meant to solve the patent
thicket problem in upstream research (namely patent pools, clearinghouses,
and open source models) are capable of achieving the goal of increasing
access to diagnostic procedures (p.454). She is optimistic that pools,
clearinghouses and open source can enable access despite widespread
genetic patenting. Her conclusion, however, does not enjoy universal
agreement from her contributors. The controversy surrounding the
applicability of such regimes stems from their ability to attract actors
interested in maximizing the value of their intellectual property. While
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open-source models have been employed to increase access to intellectual
property-protected goods in the software industry, the translation of opensource models to diagnostic testing appears to be limited to the small subset
of cases in which profit motive is not the driving force behind research and
development. Van Overwalle notes that numerous commentators are
skeptical of open-source’s feasibility in a for-profit genetics setting: “[I]t is
questionable whether [the open source] model can stand the test in market
segments aiming at the largest potential profit margins, such as the
biomedicine sector” (pp.452). Obviously, this is a rather large problem. If
open source is not an attractive alternative for profit-maximizing
organizations, the ability of open source to overcome access problems in the
medical diagnostics industry will be quite limited. Van Overwalle’s
optimism regarding the ability of licensing schemes to overcome research
access problems also must be tempered by the reality that few authors can
offer a licensing solution to the holdout problem. If valuable genetic
patents are withheld from pooling or clearinghouse schemes, the
effectiveness of those schemes in reducing transaction costs is likely to be
greatly limited. Van Overwalle acknowledges this problem (pp.448) and
suggests that “compulsory license schemes and informal norms of fair
licensing” can be helpful in eliminating blocking patents. Of course, if
reducing the access problems associated with genetic patents requires some
form of compulsory licensing scheme or relies on the establishment of
informal norms, then licensing models such as clearinghouses and patent
pools are either unnecessary or inadequate to solve the problems associated
with upstream research of diagnostic innovations.
To address the translational gap, the book deftly moves from the problem of
patent thickets and blocking patents, to the problem of downstream
commercialization. Oftentimes patents can stymie the translation of earlystage genetic inventions into medical applications because patents increase
the transaction costs between upstream researchers (often-times academics
or publically funded institutions) and downstream developers (typically
private entities) (pp.392-93). This so-called “translational gap” is wellknown in the pharmaceutical industry, but seems to be less prominent in the
field of diagnostics (pp.246-57, 392-93), primarily because finding a link
between a particular nucleic acid sequence and the ability to diagnose a
disease does not involve the same enormous investment that creating
marketable drugs entails.
In order to bridge the translational gap, the book examines various liability
regimes. The most robust proposed solution to the translation gap comes
from Arti Rai. Rai proposes a two-tiered public-private partnership in
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which participants enter into contractual agreements to treat their
discoveries under a liability regime rather than as property (p.247). Initial
research would be conducted behind a “veil of ignorance” which would be
breached only when promising collaborators had been identified. The
attractiveness of Rai’s proposal is that it increases knowledge sharing
(assuming buy-in by a large number of players) and reduces transaction
costs. Dan Burk builds on Rai’s proposal, likening the regime to one of
option trading (pp.294-306). Van Overwalle concludes that liability regimes
are “rather limited in this area [diagnostics]” (p.454). She bases this
conclusion on the practical difficulties that implementing any liability
regime is bound to face. Her concern with the hurdles faced by a liability
regime is, of course, correct. The implementation of a large-scale liability
regime to encourage development of medical technology is destined to
encounter practical problems: the devil is always in the details. However,
as Rai’s elaborate proposal demonstrates, there is common ground upon
which profit-maximizing corporations and academic researchers can
collaborate and which can result in increased diagnostic tools at reduced
prices to consumers. Because Rai’s liability regime is modeled on a world
in which players are profit-maximizing, it would seem that such a regime
would offer the best potential to create real-world change. Van Overwalle’s
practical objections aside, liability regimes provide a theoretical licensing
solution to reduced commercialization of genetic discoveries.
At the end of the book, Van Overwalle writes a final piece to summarize
and crystallize the various contributions of the authors. Her synthesis of the
literature and the contributions is very nicely done and gives the book—
which is truly an exploration of the future landscape—a feeling of finality.
The book offers an important survey of different perspectives on what is
certain to be a central issue in patent law going forward. Van Overwalle
has done an excellent job in creating a compilation that offers diverse
perspectives on the feasibility and desirability of translating successful
licensing schemes from other industries (electronics, software,
entertainment) to biotechnology. Anyone interested in the future of
diagnostic and genetic patents—and the manner in which the social
drawbacks of such patents might be mitigated—would be well-advised to
examine the book.
ENDNOTES
1

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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2

Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 2010 WL
5175124 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010).
3

New York Times, March 29, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/30gene.html; Jeffrey L.
Furman, et. al, 468 Nature 757-78 (Dec. 9, 2010).
4

See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harvard L. R. 668 (1998).
© 2011 J. Jonas Anderson
Suggested Citation: 1 The IP Law Book Review 54 (2011).
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VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF ONLINE WORLDS, by
Greg Lastowka. Yale University Press, 2010, 226 pp. Hardcover $27.50.
Reviewed by William K. Ford, The John Marshall Law School.
7ford@jmls.edu
Greg Lastowka’s VIRTUAL JUSTICE is an introduction to the legal issues
involving virtual worlds, examples of which include Blizzard
Entertainment’s World of Warcraft, Linden Lab’s Second Life, and
Disney’s Club Penguin. Many of these virtual worlds are gaming worlds,
though some, like Second Life, are better described as social worlds.
Lastowka discusses several areas of law, focusing on issues of jurisdiction,
contract, property, computer fraud (hacking), and copyright (with other
areas of intellectual property law receiving only passing attention (p.194)).
While in many ways the book is a survey of the field, threaded throughout
the discussion are two related arguments, both made quite gently. The first
is that it is meaningful to conceive of “virtual law” as a separate body of
law. At present, virtual law is only “one corner of cyberlaw” (p.74), but
Lastowka predicts it will and should become a distinct and recognized body
of new law in the future (pp.11, 69). The second is that virtual law should
be distinctive in large part by empowering customers against the “wizards”
and the “online overlords” who own and control virtual worlds (pp.153,
195).
Lastowka defines virtual worlds as “persistent, interactive, simulated social
places where users employ avatars” (p.31). For those who are not up to
speed on virtual worlds, let alone the legal issues raised by them, the early
chapters will fill in the gaps. While the lines between them are not rigid,
Lastowka divides virtual worlds into three basic categories: (1) MMORPGs
(Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games), (2) social worlds, and
(3) kid worlds (p.58). MMORPGs like World of Warcraft are the game
worlds (pp.59-61). Social worlds like Second Life are virtual worlds
without the gaming elements. They are instead places to “hang out” (pp.61-
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64). Kid worlds may be more like MMORPGs or more like social worlds,
but either way, they are oriented towards children and feature heavy
restrictions on what users can do and say (pp.64-66). In explaining the
development of these modern virtual worlds, Lastowka reviews several
areas of relevant history, including the ancient Greeks (Plato’s Cave) and
more contemporary novels, films, television shows, and non-electronic
games (pp.29-38). For example, Dungeons & Dragons, probably more than
any other game, provided important ideas for the features and content of
early computer adventure games, and its influence remains evident to this
day (pp.36-38, 59). The history of virtual worlds is of course in substantial
part the history of computer and video games, and Lastowka covers the
important developments here as well. 1
Lastowka’s first major point is the distinctive character of virtual law. Like
aviation law, which became the subject of comprehensive legislation in the
1920s, he sees virtual law as also becoming a body of “new law” (pp.6869). As someone who teaches a seminar on computer and video game law,
it might be expected that I would be sympathetic to this argument, but I see
this area of law as mostly about the nuances of established fields of law,
such as intellectual property law and First Amendment law. A sensible law
school course is not about examples of disputes that happen to involve
video games (or horses), e.g., an employment discrimination dispute that
involves a video game publisher, but it could be about legal questions where
the presence of video games affects the legal analysis. For example, what
features of a game constitute unprotectable procedures, processes, or
systems under 17 U.S.C. 102(b)? 2 Are video games more like posters and
coffee mugs or more like books and films for purposes of the right of
publicity? 3 May the government restrict minors’ access to violent video
games because video games have negative effects attributable to video
games’ particular form of interactivity? Even if focusing on these questions
does not “illuminate the entire law,” 4 they are substantial and worthwhile,
but I don’t think they define a truly separate area of law. Lastowka,
however, finds more than just nuances in virtual law.
Virtual worlds often include gaming elements, and Lastowka views law and
games as an uneasy mix, at least as the law exists now. He views games as
separate jurisdictions from law, “jurisdictions of play” (p.105). Games are a
“rival regime of social ordering” to law, and game rules are “inherently in
tension with the rules of law” (p.105). “We desire laws,” says Lastowka, “to
be rationally designed to efficiently promote the common good” (p.108).
Games are different. They are “strange, inefficient, and economically
counterproductive” (p.137). The consequence is apparently to push the law
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and virtual worlds apart and create both an opportunity and a need for new
law to deal with the resulting “anarchic online frontier” (p.121).
This tension between law and games is, I think, overstated. We want law to
further the common good and various social ends. One of these ends surely
includes the individual enjoyment afforded by a recreational activity like
gaming. As a related example, law presumably favors the (efficient)
production of films desired by consumers. It would be odd if law was then
hostile to consumers enjoying them, as if law favored only production and
not consumption. Perhaps the enjoyment of games is somehow different
than the enjoyment of films in terms of efficiency, but the apparent
inefficiency of games is essential to their enjoyment. Lastowka quotes
Bernard Suits’ characterization of games as being “directed towards
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by the
rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favor of less efficient
means” (p.109). But Lastowka omits the rest of this description: “the rules
[of games] are accepted just because they make possible such activity.” 5
The rules are essential to a game. While Lastowka concludes “play is . . .
oriented toward a process, not a goal” (p.115), Suits points out the
important relationship between rule-governed processes and goals: “Rules
in games thus seem to be in some sense inseparable from ends, for to break
a game rule is to render impossible the attainment of an end.” 6 Assume a
race around a circular track, an example used by both Suits and Lastowka
(p.109). Would law, with its goal of efficiency, prefer that the contestants
cut across the middle rather than run around the track? Lastowka apparently
thinks so, but I don’t see why.
While I do not think that there is an inherent tension between law and
games, I agree with Lastowka that they can sometimes clash. Lastowka
discusses the example of the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding that the
decisions of football referees cannot be challenged in court (p.109). 7 He
suggests that “law may have difficulty balancing the competing interests”
between law and games because game rules are “sub-optimal” (p.110), but
the law’s existing interest in efficiency and the common good seems a help
rather than a hindrance. It supports allowing players to resolve their
disputes through expert private referees rather than courts, at least when the
disputes are of the conventional type for the relevant game. And despite the
literal words of the Georgia Supreme Court—“courts of equity in this state
are without authority to review decisions of football referees” 8 —there are
undoubtedly limits. Referees cannot imprison or execute players as
penalties, but there is much referees can do that courts can quite properly
and quite confidently decline to second guess.
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As a potentially more serious clash between law and games, Lastowka
claims that courts have allowed at least some games, such as football, to
“operate outside the boundaries of traditional social expectations” because
at least some violence is permitted in football (p.113). Traditional social
expectations, however, often countenance at least some violence. It all
depends on the context. Russian roulette is out because the risks are so great
and the benefits are so negligible. 9 Football offers greater benefits (in terms
of competitive enjoyment and spectator entertainment), and it does so with
much less risk than Russian roulette. The limited autonomy granted to
football is not because games are a sort of oddity that law struggles to deal
with, but because law recognizes this autonomy is necessary to preserve the
legitimate social value of games.
To the extent law grants games limited autonomy, what do we make of
situations where, for example, game rules allow one player to defraud
another, especially in a virtual world containing virtual property with real
world value? Lastowka quotes a commenter on a blog who rejects the
notion that such activity should be a problem: “It would be like suing
someone you lost to at poker” (p.121). This seems correct to me. Like
bluffing in poker or outright lying in a game of Diplomacy, thievery could
very well be a legitimate “play style.” In Electronic Arts’ Ultima Online,
this is the clearly stated rule (p.13). Thievery is part of playing the game,
not the basis for a complaint to Electronic Arts—or to a court. 10 Lastowka
seems to have doubts about these types of rules, even when they are clear,
but the more difficult problem he discusses involves situations where the
rules of the game are ambiguous.
Ambiguous rules of conduct with real world monetary consequences can
arise in any virtual world, including social worlds that lack traditional
gaming elements and even in virtual worlds that prohibit the buying and
selling of virtual items. Not surprisingly, there is extensive buying and
selling of these items in violation of contract terms. Lastowka reports that
Blizzard Entertainment has closed thousands of World of Warcraft accounts
of players engaged in “gold farming,” the harvesting of virtual money to
sell to other players (pp.22-24). Sony Online closed the account of someone
who supposedly made approximately $100,000 from selling virtual
currency for Everquest II (p.159). In these situations, the gold farmers knew
the risks of violating the contract terms. A loss from closed accounts, when
it happens, does not seem inappropriate. Nor is it unfair to prohibit buying
and selling in the first place. Virtual world owners need to control their
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worlds to maintain the experience of players (p.140). Even insuring the
scarcity of virtual items is necessary to maintain player interest (p.165).
But what if virtual property is legitimately bought and sold in a virtual
world, and someone loses this investment for violating an ambiguous rule?
Such problems are not completely novel. As a related example, courts have
resolved ambiguous contest rules. In one case, the question was whether a
player in a golf tournament managed to shoot a hole-in-one on the required
hole to win an automobile; unfortunately, the required hole was
ambiguously defined. 11 Virtual worlds magnify this type of interpretive
problem. Games like poker have relatively simple rules compared to a
virtual world. The software necessary to support a virtual world and
regulate player conduct is extremely complicated. Glitches and bugs are
common and are often discovered by players before the virtual world
owners (pp.156-160). It can often be genuinely unclear whether a particular
activity in a virtual world constitutes cheating and different players can
legitimately have different expectations (pp.121, 145-46). Hard cases will
likely result.
As an additional complication, virtual world users may expect owners to
assist them against other users. Second Life’s terms allowing users to retain
their copyrights in uploaded content inevitably generates conflicts among
users over copyright violations (pp.191-93). Users with disputes may
demand the virtual world owner act. One class action lawsuit against
Linden Lab was based on its alleged failure to act to protect user property
(p.193). Users may instead sue each other, but virtual world owners may be
dragged into these disputes as well (p.141). From the standpoint of virtual
world owners, creative freedom for users combined with user ownership
can “attract lawsuits from all directions” (p.193).
Virtual world owners—the “online overlords” (p.195)—recognize all of
these problems and are likely to protect themselves with contract terms
sometimes perceived (rightly or wrongly) as one-sided (pp.93-96). As a
contributing cause of one-sided terms, Lastowka points to the problems of
consumers not being able to freely negotiate terms with virtual world
owners and often not reading the terms (p.91). While these are conventional
concerns, I doubt the potential problem here has much to do with contracts
of adhesion. 12 For most people, even most contracts professors, not needing
to negotiate or even read most contracts is surely a blessing, not a curse.
There may still be virtual world terms that the law should not enforce, and
interesting questions will no doubt arise about whether one-sided terms in
these contracts rise to the level of unconscionability, but like the questions
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mentioned earlier, I see these issues as more likely representing the nuances
of contract law rather than truly new law.
Lastowka’s most aggressive suggestion for dealing with at least some of the
legal problems of virtual worlds is to create “democratic and participatory
structures,” ones that would empower players by allowing them to more
directly participate in the governance of virtual worlds. He doesn’t detail
how these should be created or argue for particular participatory structures,
but he does briefly describe one experiment in virtual government in the
relatively small virtual world of LambdaMOO (pp.40-41, 79-84). He
describes the experiment, while it lasted, as “complicated, theatrical,
contentious, and time-consuming” (p.82). Weighing against this innovation
in other virtual worlds would be the desires of the players themselves. I
assume Lastowka is correct when he predicts most players would not be
interested in virtual legislatures or similar features in their virtual worlds
(pp.89, 195).
With easy entry and exit into virtual worlds and extensive competition
among them, I worry much less than Lastowka about the “anarchic online
frontier,” and I also doubt the future of virtual law becoming the distinctive
field Lastowka envisions. I readily agree, however, that the legal questions
raised by virtual worlds are interesting, substantive, and worthy of scholarly
attention, and Lastowka’s book provides an excellent introduction to them.
ENDNOTES
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Given the nature of the book, it is perhaps a justified quibble to note that
Lastowka incorrectly refers to Ralph Baer as the inventor of Pong and the
inventor of the patent covering table tennis, a patent that figured
prominently in the legal history of the video game industry (p.37). Baer is
certainly relevant to the general discussion as he is credited with the pioneer
patent in the video game industry. See Magnavox Co. v. Chicago Dynamic
Indus., Nos. 74-1030 and 74-2510, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17996, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1997) (“[Baer’s] ’480 patent, I think, is the pioneer patent
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Rusch is also the inventor listed on the relevant patent. See U.S. Patent No.
RE28,507 (“Television Gaming Apparatus”). As Baer notes in his own
history of video games, it was Rusch’s patent that was the critical one for
determining infringement during the many years of litigation. Baer, supra
note 1, at 126. See also Magnavox Co. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 80-4124, 1982
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13773, at *96 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1982) (finding
infringement of the ’507 patent); Magnavox Co. v. Chicago Dynamic
Indus., Nos. 74-1030 and 74-2510, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17996, at *16-17
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1997) (same).
2

See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 245-46 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (suggesting that the game play mechanics for the movement of video
game playing pieces are subject to copyright protection); Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Artic Int’l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-1014 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that an
unlicensed device that speeds up the rate of play of a video game violated
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner to produce derivative works).
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See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 7:26 (2d ed. 2010); Restatement (3d) of Unfair Competition, §
47 cmts. b and c.
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See, e.g., Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325, 337-38 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(“[A] participant has a 16.7% chance of being killed or seriously injured
and an 83.3% chance of not being killed or seriously injured in a game of
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trigger. The act is so dangerous and so lacking in social utility, however,
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that it demonstrates extreme indifference to human life and serves to
distinguish murder from manslaughter.”).
10

The policy states, “[A]nything considered a valid play style in Ultima
Online is not considered harassment. In other words, player killing and
thievery, including res-killing, is not considered harassment. By valid, we
mean that there are game mechanics created around these play styles in
Felucca, such as stat loss, the thieving skill, bounty systems, murder counts,
the existence of guards, etc. Ultima Online is a role-playing game that
encourages various play styles, and players should seek ways of protecting
themselves against these play styles through game mechanics rather than
calling on customer support staff for help in these cases.” Ultima Online
Harassment Policy, available at http://support.uo.com/harass.html
(emphasis in original).
11

See, e.g., Grove v. Charbonneau Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 853,
856 (N.D. 1976) (“The offer made by Charbonneau Buick stated that a 1974
Pontiac Catalina would be awarded to the ‘first entry who shoots a hole-inone on Hole No. 8.’”).
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Rev. 933 (2006).
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THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES, by Roberta Rosenthal Kwall. Stanford
University Press, 2010, 247 pp. Cloth $22.45.
Reviewed by Shubha Ghosh, University of Wisconsin Law School.
ghosh7@wisc.edu.
Professor Roberta Kwall’s book brings together a wealth of academic
literature and case law analysis to make the argument for a more fully
developed and rounded moral rights regime in the United States. For those
readers unfamiliar with the debate within copyright law, a moral rights
regime is a system of legal rights and duties that protects the rights of an
author of a work from the distortion, misattribution, or unauthorized or
unfavorable publication of the work. Continental Europe originated such a
system in the Nineteenth Century. The theoretical underpinnings are in the
work of Immanuel Kant on the relationship between the private and public
spheres and the need for protecting the dignity interests of individuals who
publicize their private thoughts. Moral rights developed on the European
continent through the efforts of Victor Hugo as a means to protect the
interests of authors against publishers. A moral rights regime recognizes an
inalienable right in the dignity of authors against publishers who would treat
authorial works as mere commodities to be altered, distributed, and
commercialized as the market demanded.
Professor Kwall offers an original argument in support of legal reform in
the United States that would recognize the moral rights of authors. Her
argument begins with a recognition of the creative urge in individual
authors (pp.11-12). This creative urge, grounded in spirituality, imbues
works of authorship with a meaning and message (pp.20-21). Professor
Kwall argues that a moral rights regime is needed to protect this meaning
and message from misattribution and from adaptations and uses that
compromise the integrity of the work (pp.21-22). With this aim in mind,
Professor Kwall explores how moral rights are consistent with the public
domain (pp.66-67), with separating the rights of employer and employees in
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copyrighted works (pp 100-101), with protecting the artistic persona more
effectively than traditional right of publicity doctrines (pp.129-131), and
with recognizing international human rights treaties (pp.143-44). She
concludes with a reform proposal for recognizing a right of attribution and a
limited right of integrity in the Copyright Act (pp.148-150).
As Professor Kwall reminds us, United States Copyright law has long
eschewed such subtleties and treated copyrighted work as an ordinary
commodity subject to utilitarian-based legal regulation (pp.42-43). This
arrangement suited the United States fine until the country had to recognize
some form of moral rights in order, in the late 1980’s, to be able to sign
onto the Berne Convention, a multilateral treaty governing global
copyrights. Professor Kwall’s case for moral rights, needless to say, is not
based on such expediency. Her goal is to develop a rich theoretical
justification for a moral rights regime and a legislative proposal for
implementing moral rights within existing copyright law. Her broader goal
is to break free of the utilitarian constraints on United States copyright law
in order to recognize greater legal protections for creators and the creative
persona (which may or may not be distinct depending on how one reads the
argument). The book is provocative and a seminal academic work on the
topic of moral rights. But for those mindful of intellectual property policy, I
would be very cautious in moving its ideas out of the academic realm and
into that of concrete policy, for reasons I develop below.
At a very basic level, Professor Kwall is making the case for non-economic
rights in copyright law. She begins the book with a discussion of how U.S.
copyright law does not protect authorial integrity or attribution. For
example, if I publish a work but put the name of the wrong author on the
work, I have not violated copyright law. Similarly, if I destroy the work or
physically mutilate the work, I also have not violated copyright. In some
circumstances, the author can obtain a remedy for the economic harm
created by these acts through tort remedies, such as defamation or
conversion. But federal copyright law offers no or limited redress. What is
troubling for Professor Kwall is copyright law’s silence as to the
noneconomic harm created in these two examples, specifically the harms to
the authorial personality and the creative vision imbued by the author. The
work is an extension of the author, and the distortion and destruction of the
work inure to the author. A system of economic rights misses this point
entirely.
What is original about Professor Kwall’s argument is her grounding of these
non-economic interests in a more sophisticated understanding of the
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motivations of individual creators. Utilitarian foundations for copyright,
Professor Kwall implies, are based on material gain as the sole, or primary,
motivation for creation. Psychology and religion prove otherwise. It would
not be a distortion of Professor Kwall’s argument to say that she sees the
roots of creativity as spiritual, whether understood in emotional or
theological terms. This argument is developed in the second chapter of her
book and is the basis for the rest of her argument, which consists of
identifying how U.S. copyright law is out of step with the legal regimes of
other countries. I would argue that her case for understanding the
motivations for creativity is the keystone for her book. Starting from that
premise, I will make it the primary focus of the rest of this review. Does
Professor Kwall have it right about what motivates creativity and, if so, do
her critique and policy recommendations follow?
Professor Kwall isolates two distinct types of motivation for creativity, noneconomic and spiritual. Although they can be confused, they are different.
Non-economic motivation is based on something other than the calculation
of the return or reward of creating a new work. An artist may create
spontaneously or on a whim. The work may be a labor of love, resulting
from much sacrifice and both emotional and physical pain. Nonetheless,
the creator continues to produce the work purely for the sake of creating.
Spiritual motivation may also involve such sacrifice and may, from a costbenefit perspective, not be worth it. But a creator driven by spritual
motivation gains something: a spiritual reward, the ecstasy of spiritual
release, the satisfaction of serving one’s muse. One can go so far as to say
that spiritual motivation may include the love of lucre, the reward that
comes from material success is a sign of divine election. Adam Smith’s
infrequent use of the term “invisible hand” in The Wealth of Nations was
meant ironically, a jab at those who viewed wealth as the result of invisible
forces as opposed to the hard work and energies of the mercantile class and
workers. A case could be made that the wealth of nations derives from noneconomic motivation, individuals acting in their narrow interest to work and
provide labor independent of any direct reward from that labor.
Motivations for any act are complex. Do we write law review articles for
monetary reward? Spiritual ones? Purely personal ones? I imagine all of
these motives are true. An acquaintance who is an English professor asked
why I cared so deeply about a specific author and his novels. From his
perspective, a new novel from the particular author meant more things to
write articles about and the greater prospect for a raise. The time I spend
reading, thinking, and writing on the same novel goes seemingly
unrewarded. Is this an investment in some yet-to-be seen reward, a frolic, a
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source of spiritual satisfaction? Depending on how one looks at my acts,
and when, my motivation can be construed to be any one of these. Because
of the inherent ambiguity of motivations, they generally do not serve as a
compelling linchpin for policy and legal doctrine. They may be a factor to
consider in some cases, for example in discerning mens rea. But too much
should not be made of them.
Yet motivations are critical to Professor Kwall’s argument, and they are
critical in any incentive-based justification for intellectual property rights. I
am not a big fan of incentive-based theories, largely for the same reasons
that I am skeptical about the concept of motivation. Nonetheless, I may be
in a minority on this point, and the dominant rhetoric to justify intellectual
property rights is some variation of an incentive-based theory. The problem
is that even within incentive-based theories, Professor Kwall’s proposal for
a moral rights regime in the United States seems flawed for several reasons.
First, if one accepts the proposition that motivations are mixed, it is not
clear why protection for economic motivations would not be adequate for
protecting non-economic and spiritual ones. Other areas of law also cover
multiple types of injuries without providing redress for all harms. Contract
breach can result in emotional injury for which contract law offers little
remedy. Tort law distinguishes between recoveries for physical injuries,
emotional injuries, and economic injuries and carefully circumscribes what
can be recovered for the latter two categories and has limits on the first one
as well. These choices may reflect ideology or conceptual biases towards
quantification. But more assuredly, they reflect practical choices about
what the legal system is capable of doing. Professor Kwall is less
convincing about why a focus solely on economic motivations in
intellectual property is inadequate for what the legal system can deliver.
Second, even if Professor Kwall responds to the last objection on
deontological grounds, that we need to protect noneconomic motivations
because it is the right thing to do, she would still need to distinguish
between noneconomic and spiritual motivations. If creators would produce
even without the economic reward of copyright, what then should be the
basis for remedy? It does not necessarily follow that a creator with such
noneconomic motivation would care about correct attribution or integrity
either. My guess is that much of the content on YouTube is spontaneous
creation, people who happen to have a recording device at the right time and
in the right place. Much is also staged creation by people who act on a
whim with what seemed at the time to be a funny idea. Would
misattribution or distortion of the sort Professor Kwall espouses be of
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concern to such creators? I am skeptical. I am confident, however, if such
spontaneous or whimsical creation became iconic or economically valuable
(think, for example, of the Zapruder film of President Kennedy’s
assassination), the creators would pursue those interests zealously. What is
labeled noneconomic motivation masks this implicit lottery.
However, Professor Kwall’s case becomes stronger for creators who are
driven by spiritual motivations. For such creators, the injury that occurs
from a misattribution or a distortion cannot be readily quantified or even
translated into the calculus of legal claims protecting against defamation or
conversion. On this point, Professor Kwall stands on stronger grounds.
Skeptics may harp on the abstruseness and lack of clarity in protecting
“spiritual interests.” But let me be the first to defend Professor Kwall’s
identification of spiritual motivations. The defense has little to do with
one’s theological beliefs. Rather, I am willing to accept and argue in the
defense of the existence of psychological factors that are associated with
creation. Perhaps they can be reduced to brain chemistry, the equivalent of
a runner’s high. Furthermore, these motivations do not fall neatly into
dichotomies such as religion versus science. Darwin’s On the Origin of
Species ends with a long paragraph describing the invisible, incremental
forces that lead to the development of speciation and the spread of life on
the planet. To call it spiritual may belie the materialistic theory that he was
espousing. But when compared with the literalism, the fixation on the
Biblical text, that his critics, then and now, essentially extoll, Darwin’s view
should be understood as spiritual. Aestheticians, like Edmund Burke,
would call the feeling sublime. It is perhaps the feeling some of you may
have had upon first seeing a natural wonder—Mt. Shasta, the Himalayas,
the Grand Canyon—a feeling that is stirred and amazingly inspired by a
hunk of rocks. Professor Kwall is correct in identifying this emotion, and I
have no doubt that it plays an important role in creation, both artistic and
scientific.
The problem is identifying precisely the implications the existence of
spiritual motivations has for law. John Muir, Rachel Carson, Ansel Adams
individually and collectively identified the sublime in the natural world.
Such feelings stirred the environmental movement which in turn helped to
shape environmental law. But it would be a leap to say that environmental
law somehow protects these spiritual feelings, even if they were an
inspiration for the law. The problem of contingent valuation illustrates the
problem of how to incorporate these values into a measure of recoverable
damages. Once again practicality limits how much the sublime can shape
the law.
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It is true that within a purely incentive theory of intellectual property,
spiritual motivations do not necessarily lead to the protections for
attribution and integrity that Professor Kwall is advocating. The problem,
however, is that her recognition of spiritual motivations is too
underinclusive. Much labor arguably involves spiritual motivation. The
notion of craft, for example, is in part a spiritual one. But copyright law,
like all intellectual property law, makes distinctions among different types
of work, in part for practical reasons, in part because the incentive theory
cannot fully explain the structure of intellectual property law. Why is the
integrity of the creator more needing of protection than other providers of
labor and service in society? Dignity should have more of a role in the
structure of the legal system than it does, but I feel hard pressed to conclude
that it should take the form that Professor Kwall prescribes.
Admittedly, Professor Kwall’s case is limited to recognizing dignity-based
claims in copyright law and so the previous critique may be deemed as
misguided. But even within the parameters of copyright law, Professor
Kwall’s appeal to spiritual motivations is underinclusive. If the laying of
paint on canvas, the putting of words on paper, the snap of a photograph,
each has a spiritual component, then so do the viewing and reading of
objects. The notion of the sublime applies equally, and perhaps more
forcefully, to the audience for a work. Music has charms to sooth the
savage breast, and that spiritual soothing, within the terms of Professor
Kwall’s argument, deserves recognition within intellectual property law.
Once one also recognizes that spirituality is as much a collective
experience, as an individual one, Professor Kwall’s claims return us to the
central questions that inform intellectual property policy. Is IP law about
individual reward or access? Are the terms of IP individual or collective?
Is IP policy about individual ownership or commons management?
Professor Kwall’s identification of spiritual motives in creation does not
clarify these questions and merely adds to the ongoing debate over the
structure and purpose of intellectual property.
Underlying Professor Kwall’s arguments is an appeal to stewardship in
intellectual property (pp.18-19). Unfortunately, this concept is not well
developed in the book, except for a brief discussion in the context of
copyright duration (p.58). The concept of stewardship certainly is
connected to notions of spirituality and the sublime in intellectual property
as it is in environmental law. To view intellectual property in terms of
stewardship is to recognize that creativity is beyond the scope of finitely
lived individual authors and the needs of the current generation. The
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problem is how to channel the notion of stewardship into concrete legal
reform. In Professor Kwall’s book, the concept of stewardship is raised and
then dropped as the author takes the concept of spirituality to support the
rights of attribution and integrity. But in taking such a narrow focus, the
author ignores how the concept of stewardship would apply to all users and
creators within the intellectual property system. The reform proposals
assume intellectual property rights are individual and not within a broader
communal system. As a result, the argument replicates some of the
criticisms of intellectual property and belies the appeal to stewardship that
was an enticing start to the book.
The individualistic focus of Professor Kwall’s argument is ironic in light of
the origins of the moral rights tradition in copyright. Immanuel Kant’s
conception of the moral rights system recognized an intimate connection
between the public and private realms. Creators would retreat to private
domains to develop their ideas and their work which in turn would be
disseminated in the public realm. Distortions of the work in the public
realm would affect what creators did in the private realm by either
influencing creators to retreat permanently from the public or to refrain
from creating altogether. This vision of private and public realms in tandem
informs much of contemporary intellectual property law, as can be seen in
discussions of secrecy, branding, and privacy in the fair use context.
Needless to say and perhaps not surprising, Kant had a very monastic view
of creation. In the modern world, the public and private are not distinct
realms and overlap in the creation and dissemination of creative works.
Professor Kwall’s defense of moral rights strikes me as a retreat from the
public-private remix we inhabit today to an individualistic notion of
creativity. This point may be most apparent in her discussion of joint
authorship and the claim that one co-author may have a claim against
distortions of the work by other co-authors (pp.100-101). I was left
wondering why this veto power is justified and what about the role of user
generated creation and remix more broadly. Arguably, it takes a village to
make a work or to shape an individual soul, even one driven to create.
Grounding moral rights law in spiritual foundations ignores the practical
politics that drove the development of what we call the moral rights
tradition. As a protection for the dignity of authors and artists, moral rights
was a means of protection against publishers, whose focus was solely on the
commercial potential for a work, ignoring the vision of the creator. The
famous case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 1 is an
example of this tension. The broadcast company, as publisher, distorted the
work of the Monty Python troupe as it was first being introduced to the U.S.
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audience. The court fashioned a remedy based on contract law and
trademark law, that was, as Professor Kwall points out, unsatisfactory as a
policy matter (pp.32-33). But the court’s solution illustrated the height of
pragmatism in protecting the interests of the authors against the acts of the
publishers. The U.S. statutory attempt at moral rights through the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA) completely ignores the roots of moral rights in
limiting the rights of publishers. The published cases interpreting VARA
illustrate a tension the Act creates between artists and users, specifically
municipalities or museums as surrogates for users.
Although I find much of value in her book, I am concerned that Professor
Kwall’s reform proposal might also create further tension between artists
and users, ignoring the purpose of moral rights law as protection against
publishers. The source of this tension is in identifying creativity as a
personal, spiritual experience which ignores the social context of both
creativity and spirituality. It is too limiting to view religion as purely a
personal matter. Religion and spirituality are not only about personal
salvation or personal expression. Instead, religion and spirituality see
personal salvation as part of building community norms and values, which
would include in the copyright context values of access. Perhaps Professor
Kwall does not pay enough attention to these communitarian values. But
her book may pave the path for a broader, more inclusive notion of
intellectual property.
ENDNOTES
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Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Reviewed by Marc H. Greenberg, Golden Gate University School of Law.
mgreenberg@ggu.edu.
Over the past few decades, legal scholars have recognized the merit of
focusing scholarly efforts on the role law plays in its interaction with other
areas of academic and practical disciplines. Cross-disciplinary efforts that
focus on law and society, law and economics, law and science and related
areas have become the norm. Lucas Hilderbrand’s 2009 book, INHERENT
VICE: BOOTLEG HISTORIES OF VIDEOTAPE AND COPYRIGHT is a
fascinating contribution to this cross- disciplinary oeuvre. Hilderbrand is an
Assistant Professor of Film and Media Studies at the University of
California, Irvine. Although not a lawyer or legal academic, he has
consulted with attorneys and law professors in his endeavor to understand
and offer commentary on the role copyright law played in the relatively
short-lived history of videotape and videotape recorders.
The book is presented in two parts. The first part begins with a thirty-page
introduction entitled The Aesthetics of Access, in which Hilderbrand
introduces the array of agendas which inform the book, ranging from
offering a validation of video via an aesthetic reading of its history and
impact, to the presentation of an argument that copyright law includes
users’ rights of access in addition to creators’ rights.
In his Introduction, Hilderbrand explains that the title, INHERENT VICE is
derived from a phrase librarians use to describe the effect the acidity of
chemically processed wood-pulp paper has on book pages—this is what
turns the pages brown and brittle with age. Turning to video, he asserts that
it has two inherent vices: its degenerative properties (known to anyone who
now tries to play back videos recorded more than ten years ago—sound
quality and picture deteriorate pretty quickly), and its role as a “bootleg
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technology” created “for the purpose of recording television without
permission” (p.6).
This characterization of video recorders as outlaw tech seems a bit of a
romanticized stretch. Home audio taping was already the norm by the time
video recorders were introduced to consumers, and no television networks
brought suit against video recorder companies for unauthorized taping of
shows. It was only motion picture companies, worried that home taping of
uninterrupted cable broadcasts of their feature films would cut into the prerecorded tape market, which led to Universal filing its action against Sony’s
Betamax recorder.
Hilderbrand continues this discussion with two assertions that are at the
core of INHERENT VICE. I found both of these assertions troubling and
largely unsupported. First, he asserts that “[i]t was imagined that video
could become a medium for the people and a viable alternative to broadcast
networks programming”, and that “[A]udience access suggests a partial
reorientation of power” (p.8). Hilderbrand doesn’t explain who, if not the
audience, does hold the power in this context. The issue is by no means a
simple one. The television industry, particularly today, isn’t dominated by a
single source or group—artists, distribution companies, networks, cable
distribution companies, and others share power in an uneasy union. To the
extent Hilderbrand is arguing that the creation and presentation of art by
artists places them in a power relationship with their audience, I am a bit
dubious of this claim—the struggle most artists encounter in finding ways
to get their work noticed, distributed and to make a living from their art
suggests very little power resides in their hands.
The second assertion is that bootlegging, a concept generally defined as the
unauthorized recording and distribution of audio tapes and performances,
should be re-defined as a “[f]air use of video technologies”; a use
Hilderbrand praises, saying: “Fair use bootlegging can be a beautiful thing”
(p.23). He goes on to distinguish his conception of bootlegging from
piracy, thusly: “Pirates steal for profit, not for the egalitarian or productive
redistribution of culture and information”. Id. He justifies the theft involved
in this “redistribution” by noting that despite “[w]hining about piracy, the
technology manufacturers and studios still reap enormous revenues and will
surely find new business models to continue doing so.” Id.
The distinction Hilderbrand offers between bootlegging and piracy, that the
former is done with good intentions and for the benefit of the community,
whereas the latter remains theft that should be punishable by law seems to
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suggest that civil remedies for infringement should be eliminated or at least
greatly narrowed. In essence he seems to be championing a sort of Robin
Hood approach to copyright—that it is indeed acceptable to rob the rich for
the benefit of the poor—a particularly difficult policy to apply in reality,
given the difficulty of defining who fits in each category—human endeavor
is a bit too fluid to pin down so easily.
The Introduction is followed in the first part by a detailed analysis of the
history of video, entitled Be Kind, Rewind: The Histories and Erotics of
Home Video (pp.33-72). In this chapter, Hilderbrand takes the reader back
to the rise of video in the 1970’s, chronicling the rapid spread of this
groundbreaking technology throughout the world, and its unique qualities as
a means of not only playing back pre-recorded videos (which actually came
later in the history), but also as a way for people to record and distribute
their own videos, and amateur versions, both copies and derivative works,
of pre-existing copyright protected audiovisual works. In support of his
bootlegging thesis from the Introduction, he notes that adult film
entrepreneur David Friedman asserted that “the home video market was
‘founded by pirates and pornographers’” 1 (p.34).
In the second chapter of part one of INHERENT VICE, Hilderbrand offers
his analysis of how the law, and in particular copyright law, responded to
video recorders and videocassette uses. This chapter, entitled The Fairest of
Them All? Home Video, Copyright, and Fair Use, starts with a description
of copyright law and fair use, followed by an analysis of Sony v. Universal 2 ,
the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision applying fair use doctrine to
videotape technology, a case which has become known by the name of the
first video recorder, the Sony Betamax, ie: the “Betamax Case” (pp.77114).
In this section of the book Hilderbrand aligns himself with the views of
Prof. Lawrence Lessig and the “copyleft” movement. Hilderbrand presents
the argument that contemporary copyright has become a tool of corporate
interests to suppress free expression, noting:
The considerable liberty for users in the early, anonymous, and
unregulated days of home video, the Internet, and even YouTube
has repeatedly given way to more constrained, corporatized, and
consumptive uses.
…

The IP Law Book Review

79

As Lessig argues, in the digital media age, the content, the
distribution, and the hardware are typically all owned or controlled
by corporations with vested interests in regulating them.
…
But copyright law, in particular, has increasingly served the interests
of big media at the expense of audiences and, to a certain extent,
creators 3 (pp.78-79).
Hilderbrand supports the argument that this “corporatizing” of copyright is
a movement away from copyright’s fundamental grant, which he asserts
was targeted not only to protect creators, but also those who view and
engage with their works:
Copyright works through a bargain: artists and publishers are
granted protection to commercially exploit their works in exchange
for making them publicly accessible. This means that copyright is
intended to serve the interests of the audience as much as it rewards
publishers, distributors, writers, filmmakers, musicians and
artists….L. Roy Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg argue that users’
interests in copyright law are as important as those of authors and
entrepreneurs, yet because users’ rights of access are implicit, they
are often forgotten 4 (p.80).
The argument that copyright law confers rights on users as well as creators
is subject to criticism on several fronts: first, if this right exists, it must be
implied from conduct, since nothing in Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution expressly provides for it; second, since copyright rights exist
and, under the 1976 Act, are vested, once a work is placed in a tangible
form, publication is no longer required before rights exist—so artists are
granted protection even if they never publish their works; and lastly, the
argument that users have equal rights under copyright law has only come to
the forefront of the debate as a result of the ease of copying and distribution
the digital age affords users—no one claimed to have an inherent right to
make copies of published books and distribute them without penalty until it
became easily possible to do so online.
The position that copyright has, particularly through the terms of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and the “opt-out” nature of the 1976 Act, aided
in the “corporatizing” of creative works, has been cogently presented by
Professors Lessig, Neil Netanel, Edwin Baker, Yochai Benkler, Jed
Rubenfield 5 , and many others. Yet these arguments are not unanimously
accepted among copyright scholars. In my article, Reason or Madness: A
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Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains 6 , I note that articles by Professors
Paul Schwartz & William Treanor, Kevin Galbraith and Julia Mahoney 7 , as
well as my work, offer a very different view. The explosive growth of
creative, expressive works from millions of voices given new-found access
in the digital age, offers a contrary view to the concern that expression is
being suppressed by corporate giants. The global nature of this expressive
explosion is also often overlooked by copyright’s critics, whose focus often
overlooks creative works in Asia, Africa, South America and the rest of the
world.
Unfortunately, Mr. Hilderbrand does not devote, to any significant degree,
any part of his critique of copyright to explore the other side, the procreators side, of this debate. Had he done so, the contribution INHERENT
VICE offers in this debate might have been more balanced, and might have
offered recognition of the nuanced nature of this issue.
A final note on this chapter dealing with law and video: Hilderbrand is
critical of the DMCA, arguing that in its desire to protect the nascent
Internet market, it went overboard in its pro-business orientation. He
concludes as follows:
Policies with a goal of starting up the Internet should have taken the
form of short-term funding initiatives or regulatory guidelines rather
than a permanent addition to copyright law; with the goal of
establishing Internet commerce by and large achieved, the law is
overdue for reevaluation—a reconsideration that the Supreme Court
has yet to undertake (p.103).
This struck me as an odd proposal. It is not the Supreme Court’s role to
undertake a reevaluation of law—that is the province of Congress.
Reevaluation of the DMCA has been on ongoing project of a number of
congressional committees, a process complicated by the need to try to find
new approaches that reasonably accommodate the often conflicting needs of
a wide array of stakeholders.
The second part of INHERENT VICE offers readers three case studies: the
conflict between the Vanderbilt Television News Archive and CBS over
whether copyright protected television news broadcasts; the fascinating
history of filmmaker Todd Haynes’ 1987 satire of the sad story of pop
singer Karen Carpenter, entitled Superstar: The Karen Carpenter Story, told
using Barbie-style dolls, and chronicling the rise of the Carpenters as a pop
group, and the decline and ultimate death of Karen Carpenter due to
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complications stemming from her anorexia; and the use of video chain
letters as a network in the riot grrrl feminist community (pp.117-224).
These case studies are offered to show the benefits bootlegging activity
offers to these different communities, despite their being infringing copies
and/or derivative works. The author views this activity as the kind of
benign infringement the law should be able to discern and allow.
Scattered throughout the book are what the author calls Video Clips; these
are short (4-6 pages) profiles depicting ways in which video had, and
continues to have, cultural impact. One Clip focuses on video retailing, and
how unauthorized duplication tapes, or “dubs” proliferate in the retail
context, another features videos sold at genre expos, yet another explains
the work of the Frameworks listserv, an e-mail discussion group about
underground film, and the last clip offers a discussion about artists who use
the deterioration of video over time to create artwork based on the distortion
and deterioration of the media.
While I found the case studies and video clips to be interesting reading,
particularly the discussion of the Superstar video, my sense is that if, after
reading part one of the book, you have accepted the author’s view of the
importance and value to the “commons” of what he defines as bootlegging,
then you will see the case studies and video clips as valuable anecdotal
support of that thesis. Viewed independently, however, they don’t offer
sufficient support of his viewpoint given their fairly narrow focus.
Hilderbrand concludes the book with an Epilogue entitled: YouTube: Where
Cultural Memory and Copyright Converge. His focus here is on the
controversial practice of YouTube users uploading unauthorized video
clips. He praises the impact this practice has in a variety of contexts. He
posits that it is a form of community archive, while acknowledging that the
lack of organization and completeness of it precludes considering it to be a
true and formal archive that academics could use. He opines that the
situation in which the same unauthorized clip is uploaded with added
content, or in a parody form, results in “[b]lurring distinctions between
authorship, ownership and distributing rights”, suggesting that “[t]hese
postings reflect the ethics of the cultural (and creative) commons” (p.240).
This view is a restatement of his view about video—unauthorized nonprofit use of others’ content is a “productive redistribution” which should
not be penalized. Current case law is split on this issue—a series of cases
allowing unauthorized copying if the work is “transformative” have recently
been followed by other cases (the Harry Potter codex case is an example)
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finding that the changes to a work aren’t transformative enough to escape
copyright infringement liability. Historically, these kind of pendulum
swings ultimately result in compromise approaches that adopt a middleground position – the next few years of case decisions may move us to that
firmer ground.
One benefit of INHERENT VICE is that it gets you thinking about the uses
of video in the past, and the extent and manner in which they are replicated
today. For example, unlike the video recorders of the past, DVD players
generally don’t have recording capability, and the market for blank DVDs is
not based on their use in these players. Does this mean that consumers no
longer are interested in creating their own content? No, what has happened
instead is that consumers have found a far more robust set of tools for
creating video content—their computers and even more frequently, video
cameras embedded in smart phones and related mobile devices. The ability
to create visual mash-ups and add a sophisticated array of audio and visual
effects far outstrips the capabilities available to consumers 30 years ago.
In sum, INHERENT VICE, with its blend of history and legal analysis,
helps place video and videotape recorders in their rightful place in the
history of copyright in the U.S. and provides food for thought and continued
debate over the role of copyright in the digital revolution. It is an interesting
read for scholars of law and culture.
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BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MATCHING
INFORMATION PROTECTION TO INNOVATION, by William
Kingston. Edward Elgar, 2010, 256 pp. Hardcover $115.00.
Reviewed by Kristen Osenga, University of Richmond School of Law.
kosenga@richmond.edu.
William Kingston frames this book around a clearly stated premise: the
focus of information protection regimes has shifted from benefiting the
public to benefiting private individuals with interests in the game—and this
shift is not good. Early on, protection of information was shaped by actors
with no personal stake but rather a desire to encourage invention and
innovation for the public good. These actors were primarily limited by
constitutional provisions and bureaucratic inefficiencies. As time went on,
and as information became a more important commodity, information
protection schemes were fashioned, or perhaps twisted, by the parties that
would derive the most benefit. Stakeholder driven systems are unlikely to
be able and willing to adapt to changing technology and innovation. The
transition from public interests to individual interests, Kingston claims, has
resulted in a “dysfunctional system” in need of “rescue” (p.125). Public
good must be the heart of any reform to information protection, and
Kingston concludes by offering a set of proposals to that end (pp.136-37).
The book proceeds in two parts: First, the book explains the transition of
information protection regimes from focusing on protecting the public
interest to benefiting private interests. Second, the book presents a number
of reforms that would return the balance of information protection to the
public good (p.vii). He treats the first goal in roughly the first half of the
book. Perhaps because of my familiarity with intellectual property, law,
and information protection, I found the first half of the book to be less
relevant. One intended audience for the book, as stated on its back cover,
includes “students of IP and innovation [and] patent agents and attorneys.”
I imagine these groups would react much as I did to the first half of the
book. To be fair, throughout this first half, there are a number of interesting
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historical nuggets buried, even where the topic being described was old hat.
Another intended audience, “economic policy-makers,” may find the first
half of the book somewhat more practical, particularly as Kingston weaves
economic literature and commercial data throughout his discussion of the
evolution of information protection. The second half of the book, where
Kingston sets forth his proposals for improving protection of information,
will likely be more appealing for all types of readers. In the context of
reform proposals, the author shares his wide-ranging knowledge of
protection regimes in multiple jurisdictions, as well as how protection
particularly affects different technology areas such as software or genes, to
provide a solid base on which to understand and evaluate his proposals.
Although the latter half of the book was much more attention-grabbing from
my perspective, there are note-worthy portions throughout this book for
most every reader.
A quick review of the topics of this book may help elucidate what any
particular individual reader would find interesting. Of course, a book
discussing information rights must necessarily begin by defining what is
meant by “information” and protection thereof. In an interesting chapter
that traverses from Bell’s telephone to Mozart to Murano glass makers in
Venice, Kingston presents a comprehensive conception of information
rights by integrating mathematical and biological models of information
with commons theory and economic thought.
The next three chapters discuss the historical and current state of
information rights. Kingston starts off, not addressing intellectual property
regimes, but discussing how other means of protecting information may be
more effective (p.17). Again he incorporates historical points of interest,
using the story of Boulton and Watt’s steam engines to demonstrate how
information is initially valuable only to those with the capability to make
use of it, providing a basic advantage to the originator even in the absence
of protection regimes. The introduction of corporate structures, such as
limited liability partnerships and corporations, allowed originators to pair
with investors to exploit capability (pp.21-25). After capability, Kingston
contends that marketing is the second most important means of protection.
He then covers the basics of trademark law and how it too provides the
originator of information with market power. The following chapter on
patent and copyright protection of information is less intriguing, perhaps
because it covers well-worn territory or because some of the discussion
stretches to cover subject matter that is not typically considered
information, such as pharmaceuticals (p.53), music (p.59), and plants
(p.64). Kingston wraps up his discussion of existing regimes with a survey
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of international protection of information under various intellectual property
conventions and agreements.
At this point in the text, Kingston approaches the first of his goals:
discussing how information rights evolved from a system for public good to
a system driven by interested parties. Although information protection
regimes started with the best intentions, a number of limitations prevented
these regimes from keeping pace with the evolution of technology. One
reason that American law is particularly ill-suited to protect information
rights is a “particularly strong tether to the past” and a Constitution that
prohibits forward-looking law (p.85). The Constitution is used to explain
why the growth of federal trademark law was hampered; why bodies that
could react quicker to technology change, such as state legislatures, are
prohibited from doing so; and even why patent office procedures are less
than effective. Kingston also considers how bureaucratic influences, such
as lobbying, led to the shift of information protection for the public good to
the protection of private interests.
While the reasoning behind the shift, i.e., that legal development was
occurring at a much slower pace than technological advancement, seems
fairly straightforward, the assault by these private interests took place on
many fronts. Kingston points to activities at the international, national, and
industry level, all with the intent of shaping the future of information
protection for the benefit of the actors involved. Many of the key
international intellectual property conventions were negotiated with the best
interests of the United States and Britain in mind (p.101). At the national
level, countries often enacted intellectual property laws that were not the
product of careful legislation to protect the states’ interests, but were based
on proposals offered either overtly or quietly by interested groups.
Kingston offers as examples the 1952 United States Patent Act, written by
patent attorneys but passed by a Congress that did not know what it
contained or meant (p.102) and the Japanese patent system, which facially
fulfilled the country’s obligations under international intellectual property
treaties but worked to the benefit of Japanese conglomerates (pp.106-108).
Other groups also took advantage of their size and power to focus
information protection benefits on themselves, including alliances like the
European Union and industry organizations like the Union of Industrial and
Employers’ Confederations of Europe, (UNICE), the tobacco industry, and
the American music and movie groups, including the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA).
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Because the existing regimes were not adapted to today’s technology,
including software, biotechnology, genetic inventions, and business
methods, the interested parties have forced current systems to accommodate
these and other advancements as they saw fit. At the end of the day, we
have been left with a patent system that is “in crisis,” a copyright system
that is protecting software in a way that is “bad logic and bad law,” and
international protection schemes that are simply “imperialistic, outdated,
and overprotective” (pp.127-28). Of course, as Kingston acknowledges,
others have made similar observations and suggested various routes to
improvement, such as prizes, second-tier patent protection, and
compensatory liability.
With this as a background, Kingston sets out a number of proposals to
improve the protection of information. He contends that his ideas can be
put into effect without revamping the system (pp.146-47).
These
suggestions are as wide ranging as the problems he seeks to repair, such as
setting out compulsory arbitration, changing the contours of information
protection, focusing protection on small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
and considering sui generis protection of information. Perhaps because of
this broad scope of proposals he takes on, I feel that some of the proposals
could use additional consideration and support.
Kingston begins with those proposals that would require less difficulty in
implementation. The easiest to implement, according to the author, would
be to require arbitration for dispute resolution. Because this proposal does
not run afoul of TRIPS so long as an appeal is possible and because only a
provision of national treatment would be required to make the proposal
compliant with the Paris Convention, he contends that this solution is well
within reach. In fact, Kingston states that there should not be any difficulty
in introducing compulsory arbitration in the United States, although there
may be some issues with implementing arbitration in the European Union
(pp.159-160). Aside from being easy to implement, Kingston states that
arbitration is a less expensive option than litigation, which is useful
particularly for information because of the fuzzy boundaries of these rights.
Also arbitration is becoming more and more popular in various technical
industries because of the ability to have an expert arbitrate technical
disputes. Kingston points to the interference proceedings in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, as well as the British Patent Office
opinions procedure, as being potential models when creating the arbitration
system. Although I question whether the implementation of such a system
would be as simple as Kingston contends, I agree that this would certainly
allow for smaller entities, which may not be able to afford litigation, to be
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able to participate in shaping information protection, weakening the
opportunity for large firms to solely control the shape of the laws.
Kingston next proposes to change the parameters of protection for
information. He takes particular issue with the time component of existing
intellectual property protection—20 years from filing for patent protection,
50-70 years after the author’s death for copyright protection, and nearly
indefinite trademark rights. These time frames simply are not rational
measures for information. Kingston instead suggests that money should be
a better parameter; specifically, protection should last as long as it takes for
the creator to receive a socially acceptable multiple of the investment he
made in developing the information. This multiple should ideally be based
on the subjectively assessed risk of the endeavor. The multiple would, of
course, be difficult to value, but at least a rate that corresponds to the
amount of investment would lead to more appropriate protection. The
multiple would be used as the price to be paid for compulsory licensing of
the information, and late-comers would be able to use the information by
sharing in the investment made by the originator. As further enticement,
Kingston also proposes that the compulsory licenses be imposed as a onetime payment, rather than as a royalty. The originator then has a more
secure source of recoupment of his risk and the late-comer would have
greater incentive to make the most use of the licensed information.
The idea of compulsory licensing based on a multiple is more difficult to
swallow than the mandatory arbitration proposal. Kingston acknowledges
this by providing substantially more support for this suggestion, addressing
many of the thornier aspects. Estimating the value of the investment risk,
and thus the determination of the multiple, is going to be one of the most
difficult pieces of this proposal. To this end, Kingston relates how existing
research programs, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
Programs in the United States, have had some success in developing
numbers of this type. There is also discussion on how to establish the
research and development cost basis on which to apply the multiple. Next,
he considers the effects of this proposal on a number of information-heavy
industries, such as university patents on biotechnology, computer software,
databases, and pharmaceuticals, concluding in each case that adopting this
proposal is better than any system currently in place.
Against the most typical argument, that compulsory licensing decreases
incentives for firms to engage in research and development, Kingston cites
to “more than 100 antitrust settlements” that involved compulsory licensing,
none of which, according to Kingston, had a significant adverse effect on
research incentives. Kingston also argues that some of the most widely
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licensed patents are also the most profitable, such as the Cohen-Boyer genesplicing patent (p.165). On this point, because it is such a regularly raised
issue and because, by its very nature, compulsory licensing dilutes the
incentive of exclusive rights, I would have liked to see a more vigorous
discussion.
Even were the compulsory licensing system put in place, Kingston notes
that it would not have the desired effect for smaller firms. Additional
changes to any information protection system would need to be made to
account for these actors. While Europe and other areas recognize the
potential of smaller firms, known as small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), these firms have made the most impact in the United States, both
in terms of their financial success as well as the number of United States
Patents received by smaller firms from other countries (p.177). But regular
information protection regimes are failing these firms. Either their
inventions do not reach the level required for protection, because they are
not novel or obvious in the patent field, or they are sufficiently inventive
but lack seed capital to go forward. To address these problems, Kingston
makes a wide range of suggestions. For example, inexpensive routes to
protection would be helpful, such as the concessions made by the British
Patent Office for individuals and SMEs or petty patents. He also makes
suggestions for assisting SMEs to enforce their information protection
rights, including litigation insurance. However, as he explains, a feasibility
study of patent insurance was performed at the behest of the European
Union and the results were not favorable. Indeed, the study determined that
there would need to be compulsory participation for the system not to fail
(p.186).
Another proposal that has been better received provides for a period of
incontestability for SMEs’ intellectual property, not unlike the
incontestability provision of the United States Orphan Drug Act of 1983. In
addition to avoiding the threat of litigation early in the life of the patent, the
incontestability provision would also make these inventions more attractive
to investors, thereby negating some of the negative effects of information
protection that apply particularly to SMEs. As part of implementing an
incontestability period, Kingston points to Open Review, a process similar
to the Peer-to-Patent pilot study occurring in the United States.
The last proposal that Kingston makes is also the most challenging for
implementation. One way to overcome the disadvantages of the existing
intellectual property regimes as applied to information is to protect
information directly as information (DPI). The author was the creator of
one of two DPI proposals studied by the European Union. 1 Kingston’s
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proposed “Innovation Warrant,” 2 the subject of this chapter, is not
surprisingly the one regime change in the book that is well explained and
well supported. It is also the proposal that he indicates is the “best
candidate” (p.236).
Kingston lays out the case for and the basics of DPI. The focus is not the
information itself, but the investment required to make the information into
something useful. For example, the question about whether the information
is sufficiently novel becomes: “Is the subject-matter of the application for
protection available now in the ordinary course of trade?” If the answer is
“no”, what is protected is the investment required to change the answer to
“yes” (p.210). In order for the DPI to address some of the problems
associated with traditional information protection schemes, it is important
for the protection granted to reflect the risk taken in making the investment.
The first prong that Kingston poses is that the state should both grant the
protection and enforce what it grants. The second prong is how risk should
be determined. Kingston illustrates this with a matrix relating type of
innovation (low, medium, and high) to type of risk (incremental, techtransfer, and radical) resulting in some number of years of protection
(p.215). Although the terms listed in the matrix are generally shorter than
patent protection, DPI would be preferable because of the period of
incontestability and because it would be the state’s duty to enforce.
Kingston discusses in detail the workings of the system, including the
application and enforcement processes. Included in these processes are
elements of opposition proceedings and compulsory licensing, as well as the
opinion practice used in the British Patent Office. Some of the other key
features of the DPI system include protection of expectations, because there
are categories of risk, calculated in the abstract and not subject to discretion;
reliance on third-party expertise; and flexibility to adapt to new
technologies or even to allow for different treatment of particular
technologies.
In Kingston’s epilogue, however, he concludes that implementing this
system in the countries most likely to influence international information
protection will be quite difficult. The DPI proposal is unlikely to fall within
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution and the Department of
Commerce will not want to set up, under the Commerce clause, a system
that overlaps so much with the patent system that they already oversee.
Europe, too, is an unlikely candidate because the European Union has long
worked on a universal patent for its members and has situated its
intellectual property matters in Brussels (frustrating the DPI provision of
enforcement by state). By considering DPI not as intellectual property, but
as economic policy, it is possible that European Union members could
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introduce the system nationally, although single implementations may not
give as much bang for the buck. Kingston suggests that Canada or
Australia may be better suited, but these countries have concerns about
international intellectual property that would make their adoption of DPI
improbable.
As is often the case when trying to convey an extraordinary amount of
information, not to mention describing and justifying a broad range of
proposals, it is likely impossible to make all readers happy with what has
been included and what has not. There were areas I wish that the author had
covered more concisely or not at all and areas that I would have liked to
have seen more analysis and detail. That being said, this book provides a
broad, if occasionally superficial, panorama of the current and potential
future landscape of information protection.
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PATENT ETHICS: LITIGATION, by David Hricik. Oxford University
Press, 2010. 270 pp. Paperback $225.00.
Reviewed by David L. Schwartz, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
dschwartz@kentlaw.edu.
Ethics in patent litigation is important to attorneys, not only for moral
reasons, but also because of the possibility of extreme judicial sanctions.
Many litigators know of the controversy in the high profile patent
infringement lawsuit between Broadcom Corporation and Qualcomm Inc.,
which was heard in federal court in the Southern District of California.
There, during the course of a jury trial, a witness’s testimony revealed that
relevant documents had not been produced to opposing counsel. Shortly
thereafter, the magistrate judge referred six Qualcomm attorneys to the
State Bar of California for disciplinary proceedings for the alleged nonproduction of documents. The legal press reported the story and patent
litigators took note. After further proceedings, the sanctions were eventually
lifted, but by that time, significant damage had already been inflicted upon
the attorneys’ reputations and careers. Given that many in the community
are concerned about this issue, Professor David Hricik’s book on ethics in
patent litigation is extremely timely.
Professor Hricik is one of the leading scholars on patent ethics. The present
book is the second of his two volume treatise on ethics. His previous book,
PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION (co-authored with Mercedes Meyer),
was favorably reviewed by Professor Christopher M. Holman of the
University of Missouri - Kansas City School of Law. 1 In the first book,
Professor Hricik addressed ethical issues related to practice before the
United States Patent & Trademark Office. Now, Professor Hricik has turned
his attention to practice in patent litigation, which mainly occurs in U.S.
district courts. Both books are geared toward practitioners, not academics,
which explains the somewhat hefty price of $225 for each book.
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In the current book, Professor Hricik steers the reader through many aspects
of patent litigation. The book is well organized and thoughtfully arranged.
The Table of Contents contains sufficient detail to enable a reader to
quickly locate relevant sections of the book. There is also a useful and
detailed Index, as well as a Table of Cases, both of which facilitate use of
the book.
Additionally, the book is relatively thorough on each topic which it covers.
For example, Chapter 3 of the book is devoted to conflicts of interest in
litigation. The book reiterates the basics such as identifying who is the
client and determining when an attorney-client relationship has been
formed, and then explains the rules on conflicts of interest relating to former
clients (pp.15-61) Of particular use, after discussing the “substantial
relationship” test, the book provides a table with summaries of Federal
Circuit decisions both finding a substantial relationship and not finding a
substantial relationship (pp.50-53). The chapter concludes with an in-depth
analysis of consents to conflicts, and of other reasons for denial of
disqualification (pp.62-75).
The book also has a detailed discussion of pre-trial investigations. While
many attorneys are familiar with the contours of Rule 11 in general,
Professor Hricik explains the nuances of pre-filing investigations in patent
litigation in Chapters 5 and 6. He recounts the Federal Circuit case law on
what constitutes an adequate factual investigation of the accused product
(pp.94-101). He also sets forth various ethical constraints with which
attorneys may be less familiar. For example, most lawyers understand that
they may not directly communicate with a represented party under ABA
Model Rule 4.2; rather, they must interact with the party’s attorney (pp.107109). But the book expands upon the basic understanding of the rule to
identify gray areas in the law, such as how long before the filing of a
lawsuit the rule applies (pp.109-111). Furthermore, common situations
confronted in patent litigation, such as contacting current employees
through web sites of the opposing party, are discussed (p.115).
Patent litigators rely heavily on expert witnesses. These witnesses testify
about a range of issues including infringement, validity and inequitable
conduct. The book provides straightforward information and advice about
expert witnesses and reports. It then provides more detailed information
about conflicts and disqualification of experts in Chapter 8. For instance,
the book explains that disqualification may be warranted if a first party’s
expert received confidential information from the opposing party, typically
when the opposing party was considering engaging the expert (pp.154-165).
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While most attorneys generally understand how to assist in preparation of
an expert report, few understand the applicable rules on conflicts dealing
with experts. Particularly practical, the book sets forth a checklist of best
practices for dealing with experts (pp.174-77). These include ensuring that
employee confidentiality agreements are broad, and asking the expert early
in the engagement about prior work for the opposing party or counsel.
Many of the areas discussed in the book have not been directly addressed by
Federal Circuit case law. For example, conduct during discovery is rife with
potential ethical issues. The parties resolve most discovery disputes, often
after considerable argument and discussion. Sometimes a disagreement
lingers and is brought to the trial court’s attention. Then, the district court
judge (or the magistrate judge) must rule on a motion to compel, a motion
for a protective order, or some other discovery motion. These orders and
rulings generally are not immediately appealable as they are not final
orders. Consequently, it is rare for these to ever make their way to the
Federal Circuit. This explains why there is only a very small body of
appellate case law relating to discovery in patent cases. Professor Hricik’s
book had the ability to make a significant dent in this lack of knowledge.
However, I found his section on discovery slightly unsatisfying; it was less
than ten pages (pp.182-89). I fully recognize that it is difficult to discuss
and analyze the numerous potential discovery issues that can occur in patent
litigation. However, because ethics play a significant role in discovery,
more attention is warranted.
In some areas, the law has substantially developed in the brief time period
(several months) since publication of Professor Hricik’s book. For example,
district courts have occasionally restricted access to lawyers involved in
patent prosecution from certain highly confidential documents exchanged in
patent litigation. These restrictions are located in protective orders and are
usually called “prosecution bars.” In May 2010, the Federal Circuit decided
a case of first impression about this very issue, In re Deutsche Bank Trust
Co. of America. 2 The Deutsche Bank case provides the first guidance on
prosecution bars by the Federal Circuit, and was not yet issued at the time
of the book’s publication. Professor Hricik rightly notes the issue of
prosecution bars in protective orders in Chapter 10, but given his study of
the issue, it is unfortunate we do not have his interpretation of the case or
his suggestions about how to approach prosecution bars in the future.
Finally, the book should spend more space on the relationship between
opinion counsel and trial counsel. Opinion and trial counsel both represent
the same client with similar goals. Because privilege is typically waived for
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work performed by opinion counsel (and it is rarely, if ever, waived for
work performed by trial counsel), much thought must be given as to how to
structure and organize the relationship among the client, opinion counsel
and trial counsel. Advice from Professor Hricik on this issue would have
been helpful. While the book explains the Federal Circuit case law on this
issue including a discussion of In re Seagate and In re Echostar in Chapter
10, and walks the reader thru the various ethical rules including the
prohibition in some model ethical rules on lawyers acting as both witnesses
and advocates, the book does not propose best practices or other guidelines
for practicing attorneys.
While the book is not perfect, it is an important reference for patent
litigators. Despite its minor shortcomings, some of which I have noted, the
book is a significant and useful addition to the scant literature on patent
litigation ethics. Not only is this book currently the best resource available
on the topic, its thoroughness will make it essential to litigators for years to
come.
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